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With the growing number of trading opportunities available online, software tools designed
to act on behalf of human traders are increasingly being used to automate trading activities.
The next logical step in this evolution is the automation of composite trading activities designed
to fulfill complex user goals and requirements. In this paper, we describe a model for specify-
ing composite trading activities involving concurrent and interrelated negotiations with multiple
parties and heterogeneous protocols. The model supports the specification of several types of
constraints, such as the number of required successful negotiations, the limit price for the items
to be traded, and the temporal constraints imposed by all trading parties. In order to guide
the execution of the trading activities, we describe a novel planning and execution model for
composite trading activities which is designed to maximize the expected utility of the user.
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Electronic marketplaces, especially over the Internet, allow an increasing number of trading
activities to be automated. Online auction houses (eBay, Yahoo, Amazon), online exchanges (World
Chemical Exchange, e–STEEL), and electronic communication networks (Instinet, Island) provide
the basic infrastructure for programmatic product discovery, quote polling, auctioning, bidding,
order placement, trade settlement, etc. Already, several tools for trading partners discovery, price
tracking, and automated bidding, among others, have emerged (e.g. BidXS, PhantomBidder).
Although simple automated programs [2, 3, 1] are available for bidding in concurrent auctions,
these tools are not suitable for dealing with composite trading activities which are common in
the business community. Composite trading activities can be employed in areas such as bidding in
simultaneous online (English) auctions, supply chain management, the travel industry, share trading,
foreign exchange markets, radio spectrum auctions, energy trading, and in emerging areas such as
service composition. For instance, a paper production factory may concurrently negotiate with
several suppliers for the purchase of recycled fibre. Composite trading activities involve securing
deals by means of interrelated negotiation processes. Specifically, a composite trading activity may
need to interact with multiple trading partners and marketplaces concurrently, to comply with
temporal constraints, and to deal with specialized knowledge about market mechanisms and domain
areas. Due to the large number of factors need to be considered in conducting composite trading
activities, a rigorous planning and coordination scheme is needed.
Previous studies on the design of agents for participating in concurrent negotiations (e.g. [9, 21, 7])
assume an identical negotiation protocol across all trading activities (e.g. English auction). They are
therefore not applicable to activities involving different negotiation protocols. Our work addresses
this issue by proposing a common interface which is used to abstract the internal dynamics of
trading activities. Based on this common interface, we propose a model which can be used to
specify trading activities capable of concurrently participating in multiple negotiations. Using this
model, composite trading activities are specified as assemblages of other (elementary and composite)
trading activities. Our model supports (a) buying by means of English, Dutch, first–price sealed
bid, or Vickrey auctions, (b) selling by means of a reverse auction and (c) buying/selling by means
of an alternating offers bargaining protocol.
In addition to having to comply with the rules of the underlying negotiation protocols, trading
activities are also required to comply with temporal constraints imposed by the participating nego-
tiation parties. These constraints include the end times of the negotiations (or closing time of the
auctions) and expiry times of proposals and counter proposals. The model described in this paper
deals with negotiations which have known fixed end times, or which involve proposals with expiry
dates.
When negotiations are performed, a trader may also wish to specify a maximum price at which
a deal may be reached for a given trading activity, and the required number of successful trading
activities. The model described in this paper allows these constraints to be captured, and an
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execution engine is proposed to enforce these constraints by monitoring and controlling the execution
of composite trading activities.
In order to guide the execution of the trading activities, an algorithm is provided to generate
negotiation plans each detailing the exact time and duration for which the trading activities are
going to be executed. When proposals (or bids) are sent to the trading partner (or the auctioneer),
they are bound to be honored by the senders. Cancellation of previous proposals is only possible
in certain negotiation protocols. For instance, in online English auctions, cancelling previous bids
may result in negative impact on the reputation and the bidders could be fined for any financial loss
incurred due to their cancellation. Using the planning algorithm, our approach guarantees that an
appropriate number of bids will be sent to the trading partners and as a result, no bids are required
to be cancelled during the negotiation.
Expected utilities are commonly used to compare alternative negotiation plans [23], for example
when bidding in multiple auctions [28]. In this paper, we propose a novel way to calculate the
expected utility of a negotiation plan for a composite trading activity, which takes into account all
possible outcomes should the plan be executed. The computation of the expected utility is based
on the probability functions which may be derived from the history of past negotiations. Certain
online auction houses (e.g. eBay, Yahoo) provide such histories. In our approach, we assume that
the histories of past negotiations are available.
In section 1 we review the recent work on automated negotiation. A brief introduction to
the concept of composite trading is given in section 2. The common interface for abstracting the
heterogeneity of multiple negotiation protocols is presented in section 3. The negotiation plans and
the method for computing the expected utility are described in section 4. Rules for propagation of
properties and generation of negotiation plans for composite trading activities are given in section
5. An example of generating negotiation plans for a particular trading scenario is given in section 6
and we summarize our ideas in section 7.
1 Related work
With the advancement of Internet technology, businesses increasingly rely on electronic marketplaces
for the procurement of their supplies. The combinatorial auction is a mechanism in which a number
of items are up for sale at a single auction site and bidders (agents) bid for subsets of those items.
In such cases, bidders are allowed to formulate and place conditional bids and the allocation of
the winner is carried out by the auctioneer. A bidder can express preferences for complementary
and substitutable items. Computational aspects of combinatorial auctions have been considered in
[26, 10, 37]. However, required items may not always be available at one auction. In that case, the
trader may need to consider bidding in concurrent auctions or participating in multiple negotiations
as proposed in this work. For instance, the trader may create two bidding agents to concurrently
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bid in two different auctions. The bidding activities are then coordinated by a manager agent at the
bidder’s site. However, recent work on the development of such systems focuses on deriving optimal
bidding/negotiation strategies and does not take into account three issues crucial to the composite
trading activities: trading interrelated items, support for heterogeneous negotiation protocols, and
temporal properties.
Trading interrelated items: Matsumoto and Fujita [16] have applied probabilistic analysis to
determine the strategies that are likely to obtain a positive profit in bidding for combinations of
goods that are on auction at different sites. They have categorised three requirements in composing
bids: complementary, substitutive, and independent. A complementary requirement is one in which
a bidder wants two separate items that are on auction at different sites and achieving one without
the other is worthless to the bidder. A substitutive requirement is used when a bidder wishes to get
either of two items but not both. In an independent requirement, a bidder who has a limited budget
wishes to get two items with no particular preference. Although their approach allows composition of
complementary and substitutive bids, the strategies proposed by Matsumoto et al. are only intended
for bidding in sequential English auctions.
Negotiating with homogeneous negotiation protocol: Two alternative probabilistic ap-
proaches to bidding in concurrent English auctions are proposed in [28]. The first approach is
based on the minimum probability of winning the required item while minimizing the bid which
is to be submitted. The second approach is based on the maximization of expected utility should
the agent bid in sequential order across concurrent auctions. The approach proposed in [28] differs
from ours in at least three ways. First, our approach considers trading activities with heterogeneous
negotiation protocols. Second, our solution allows users to specify a range of the required number
of successful negotiations. Third, the agent considered in [28] selects one auction at a time and
switches to a different auction based on the probability or expected utility estimation. In contrast,
our approach takes into account all the trading opportunities available by building an a priori plan.
Preist et al. [21] have proposed a coordination algorithm for an agent bidding in multiple English
auctions for m identical units of an item. The algorithm ensures that the agent makes “at most” m
purchases at the end. Their approach differs from ours in at least three ways. First, our approach
allows users to participate in trading activities with heterogenous negotiation protocols. Second,
our solution allows users to specify a range of the required number of successful negotiations. Third,
our approach provides modular compositions of complex trading activities.
Dumas et al. [7] have also proposed an approach to develop agents which are capable of bidding
in concurrent single-unit auctions. The bidding agent’s behavior is based on a prediction method and
a planning algorithm. The prediction method estimates the probability of winning an auction with
a given bid whereas the planning algorithm determines where and how much to bid. The prediction
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method derives the probability functions from the history of past negotiations. The agent described
in [7] is restricted to homogeneous negotiation protocol across all trading tasks (e.g. English auction).
Nguyen et al. [19] have proposed a heuristic model for coordinating multi-attribute bilateral
negotiations in a service-oriented context. In their framework, a buyer agent is designed to coordinate
several concurrent threads to negotiate with seller agents. Each thread is assigned with a negotiation
strategy corresponding to a specific seller agent. During the negotiation, the buyer agent can adapt
its negotiation behavior based on the results of successfully terminated threads. The coordination
mechanism within the buyer agent also ensures that procurement by the agent does not exceed the
limit. Although their approach addresses the multi-attribute concurrent negotiation problem, the
coordinating framework is limited to the alternating offer bargaining protocol.
Rahwan et al. [22] have proposed a multi-agents framework for coordinating multi-attribute
bilateral negotiations. In their framework, a buyer/seller agent is designed to coordinate a number
of sub-agents [22] to negotiate with other agents. All sub-agents carry the same preferences and
constraints of the coordinating agent and each sub-agent is capable of negotiating with respective
agent based on different negotiation strategies. Similar to the work of Nguyen et al. [19], the
framework proposed by Rahwan et al. [22] is limited to an alternating offer bargaining protocol. In
addition, the framework is only tested for trading of alternative items.
In summary, previous studies on the design of strategies for complex trading activities [16, 28, 21,
7, 19, 22] assume a homogeneous negotiation protocol across all trading tasks (e.g. English auction).
They are therefore not applicable to activities involving heterogeneous negotiation protocols.
Negotiating with heterogeneous negotiation protocols: Byde et al. [6] have proposed a
heuristic algorithm for an agent bidding in multiple heterogeneous auctions. The agent is designed
to procure identical items across several heterogeneous auctions. Based on past negotiation episodes,
the agent derives a belief function which is used to estimate the probability of winning an item in a
given auction. The heuristic algorithm then makes bidding decisions based on the expected utility of
participating in the set of upcoming auctions. The algorithm selects all the auctions that the agent
wishes to consider and generate potential courses of actions. Each action consists of a combination
of target auctions in which the agent should bid at a specific point in time. However, the agent
considered in [6] does not consider the procurement of complementary items.
Anthony et al. [5] have proposed a series of tactics for an agent bidding in multiple heterogeneous
auctions for a single item. A tactic is basically a set of decision functions for calculating future bids
based on the amount of remaining time before the end of the auction, the desire to bargain, the
degree of desperation to obtain the item, and the number of auctions remaining where it is possible
to bid. The agent considered in [5] takes local decisions, in the sense that it selects one auction at a
time rather than computing a bidding plan for all the remaining auctions. In contrast, our approach
takes into account all the trading opportunities available by building an a priori plan. In addition,
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our approach allows users to specify the exact number of units of the same or different items which
have to be obtained across concurrent trading activities – traditionally considered to be a key aspect
of rational negotiators [23].
Temporal properties: Another important factor in automated negotiation is the temporal prop-
erties of bidding agents. Although recent work on concurrent negotiations [7, 19, 5, 21, 28] addresses
the temporal properties such as the hard deadline set by the trader and the start and end of the
auctions, these frameworks do not consider delays caused by the communication channel, and the
duration that the auctioneer is likely to take to announce the outcome after the auction has closed.
These temporal properties should not be ignored since they can have significant impact on the
scheduling and execution of trading activities in real-time environments.
Summary: Although the frameworks for automated negotiation reviewed in this section do not
address all three properties, they provide an important foundation for the development of a frame-
work that can support those properties. The work of Matsumoto and Fujita [16] has laid the
foundation for specifying composite trading activities for concurrent negotiations. Although their
framework does not support heterogeneous negotiation protocols, it provides a clear description of
possible interrelationships among items to be traded. Recent frameworks proposed in [5, 6] show
that utility maximising agents can be designed to trade across concurrent heterogeneous auctions
for one or more identical items. All these frameworks [16, 5, 6] exploit histories of past negotiation
episodes to derive the probability functions for placing required bids. However, these frameworks
have several disadvantages since they rely on a single process architecture. The agents developed
from these frameworks are less customisable since new strategies cannot be added without modify-
ing the agent’s architecture. They are also less robust since any failure in one negotiation thread
may effect/interrupt the agent’s negotiation capability. These shortcomings can be alleviated if a
distributed architecture is used. The multi-agent framework proposed by Rahwan et al. [22] shows
that multiple autonomous bidding processes (sub-agents) acting on behalf of a coordinating agent
can be more effective in concurrent bilateral negotiations compared to a complex single process
architecture. A summary of the agents reviewed in this section is depicted in Table 1.
From Table 1, we can conclude that the existing work on automated negotiation only address
some of the three properties: support for heterogeneous protocols, trading interrelated items, and
consideration of temporal properties such as delays in placing bids. So far, no single agent has been
reported to cover all three properties. Clearly, the recent approaches which have been employed
to manage interrelated, and potentially replicated, trading activities across different markets are
inadequate. To address all these issues in a rigorous, coherent, and systematic way, a framework is
needed for the specification and execution of composite trading activities.
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Framework Trading Negotiation Agent’s Consideration Consideration Exploit
Complementary Protocol Architecture? of Auction of Delays? Past
Items? Supported? Start/closing Negotiation
Time? Episodes?
Matsumoto et al. [16] Yes Homogeneous Multi-agent No No Yes
Onn Shehory [28] No Homogeneous Single Process Yes No Yes
Preist et al. [21] No Homogeneous Single Process Yes No Yes
Dumas et al. [7] No Homogeneous Single Process Yes No Yes
Nguyen et al. [19] No Homogeneous Multi-agent No No No
Rahwan et al. [22] No Homogeneous Multi-agent Yes No No
Byde et al. [6] No Heterogeneous Single Process No No Yes
Anthony et al. [5] No Heterogeneous Single Process Yes No Yes
Table 1: Agents for bidding in concurrent auctions
2 Overview of the approach
A key element in specifying trading strategies is the understanding of how basic elements of a trading
activity can be defined. An Elementary Trading Activity (ETA) is defined as a set of tasks required
for the purpose of reaching a trading agreement (i.e. a deal) with a specific trading partner based
on a given negotiation protocol. These tasks are typically structured in three phases: discovery of
trading partners, negotiation and trade settlement. In this paper, we focus on negotiation (also
known as the intention phase and the agreement phase [17]), where synchronization between several
interrelated trading activities is required. An ETA is described by the following attributes: the
action to be taken (e.g. buy or sell), the description of the item (e.g. name, number of units), the
description of the trading partner, the negotiation protocol employed, and the temporal constraints
involved. An example of an ETA from the financial trading domain is: “Negotiate with seller A to
buy 2000 units of BHP with the price of $10 using the bargaining protocol. The trade should be
executed before 12:00 13-Nov-2005 and after 10:00 13-Nov-2005.”
A Composite Trading Activity (CTA) may comprise one or more (elementary or composite)
trading activities. For instance, a buy–sell CTA may include two ETAs, one for buying and one for
selling. ETAs within a composite trading activity can be interrelated or independent. There are at
least two possible types of relationships among two interrelated trading activities, complementary
and alternative.
Complementary: Two trading activities are complementary [16] when both of them have to
be successful or neither should them succeed. For instance, in bundle trading (often found in the
financial trading domain), a trader simultaneously purchases or sells an entire portfolio or a cross–
section of a portfolio [8]. Index fund managers, index arbitragers, hedgers, and equity managers
frequently employ bundle trading to maintain the ratios in their portfolio holdings. For example,
a fund manager might like to sell 60% of shares from 10000 units of BHP stock and 70% of shares
from 20000 units of NOKIA stock. In order to re–balance his/her portfolio, the fund manager is
determined not to sell any stocks at all if one of these trades is not successful. In other words, all
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selling activities should be successful or none of them should be successful.
Complementary trading activities are also used in Options trading. An option is a right but not
an obligation to buy or sell a given security at a certain price within a given time [34]. There are
two basic types of options. A call option gives the holder the right to buy an asset by a certain date
for a certain price and a put option gives the holder the right to sell an asset by a certain date for a
certain price [11]. A straddle is an option trading strategy [11] that involves “simultaneous purchase
of an equal number of puts and calls that have the same underlying stock, strike price and expiry
month” [34]. The strike price is defined as the predetermined exercise price of a put or call option.
Suppose that BHP is currently being traded at $18, an example of a straddle which includes two
complementary trading activities can be defined as follows:
• Task1: Buy 1000 units of BHP July call option of strike price $19 at $0.20 per unit.
• Task2: Buy 1000 units of BHP July put option of strike price $19 at $0.12 per unit.
Alternative: Two trading activities are in an alternative (also known as “substitutive” [16]) rela-
tionship when only one of the activities has to be successful. For instance, the manager of a paper
production factory may concurrently negotiate with two suppliers for 500 tons of pulp and be plan-
ning to choose the one with the lower acceptable offer. In this case, at most one of the two ETAs
should be successful. Alternative ETAs also occur in financial trading. In the US equity market,
significant trading occurs through one–to–one bargaining between brokers (e.g. in the so–called up-
stairs markets [13]). In this context, a trader can be involved in two alternative activities in which
the same security is sought from two different brokers: these negotiations are synchronized so that
at the end, the trader chooses the cheaper offer.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no commercial tool supporting concurrent negotiations
involving complementary and alternative trading activities that rely on different negotiation proto-
cols. CTAs such as bundle trading and upstairs markets negotiation are still synchronized manually.
Furthermore, a CTA can involve both complementary and alternative activities. For instance, the
purchasing department of a paper mill is planning to buy recycled fibre and hydrogen peroxide
according to the following plan:
• buy 500 tons of recycled fibre from seller S1 or S2 and
• buy 300 gallons of hydrogen peroxide from seller S3 or S4.
The hydrogen peroxide is used for bleaching (de–inking) the recycled fibre in order to produce
pulp. The purchasing department is determined not to transact if any of those purchases is unsuc-
cessful. This example suggests that a CTA can be viewed as a composition of ETAs and other CTAs
as shown in figure 1.
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In principle, ETAs within the same CTA can be executed concurrently. However, there are
occasions during execution when the ETAs need to be “synchronized” so that a global decision is
taken. For example, in figure 1, ETAs (D) and (E) need to be synchronized to make sure that only
one of them goes ahead. ETAs (F) and (G) also need to be synchronized. In addition, both buying
activities, which are depicted as CTAs (B) and (C), need to be synchronized so that both of them
will be successful or neither will be. These observations suggest a model where trading activities are
represented as trees in which the leaves denote ETAs and the internal nodes denote CTAs which are
the instantiations of synchronization constructs.
In the long run and after undergoing significant validation and testing, techniques for automating
trading strategies such as the ones proposed in this paper have the potential to drive the emergence
of new models of trading through technology-driven innovation.
Proposed model and scope: The proposed model for specifying composite trading activities
is based on a construct [Min..Max], informally defined as follows: “given a number of concurrent
trading activities, at least Min activities and at most Max activities are to be successful or none
of them should succeed”. The example given in figure 1 can be modelled using this construct as
depicted in figure 2, in which the CTAs of figure 1 are replaced with the construct.
Requesting the user to specify synchronization constructs is not a major overhead, since these
constraints are only required for internal nodes, and the number of internal nodes is independent of
the number of trading partners. In order to avoid inconsistencies, an ETA is not allowed to appear
under more than one synchronization construct (i.e. it cannot have multiple parent nodes). For
instance, ETA D in figure 2 should not be modelled as a child node of both B and C. If such sharing
of ETAs was allowed, then an ETA could potentially receive contradictory instructions from the
synchronization constructs to which it is linked: one of them requiring it to accept a given deal, and
the other node requiring it not to do so.
In addition to specifying the number of required successful trading activities for each CTA, the
model also allows the trader to specify the following types of constraints for each ETA:
• the start and end time of trading activities,
• the expiry date for any proposal sent to the trading partner (in bargaining protocol), and
• the maximum price at which a deal may be reached (limit price).
The reason for specifying limit prices for each node is that every leaf node corresponds to a given
item, and items may differ from each other even when they fall in the same category. This can
happen for example because the items are sold by sellers with different reputation, or because they
have different quality characteristics. In the worst case, every leaf in the tree corresponds to an
item with its own unique characteristics, and the user may have a different limit price for each of
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them. Hence, the price has to be established independently for each item. In other cases however,
items can be classified into categories, with all items in a category having identical prices (e.g.
shares with the same ticker). For these situations, a mechanism could be built on top of our model
which would allow the user to set the price for each category rather than for each individual item.
Such mechanism however is not built into our model, as price determination is considered to be an
orthogonal issue which can be handled separately.
In the proposed model, the user is not allowed to specify maximum price constraints across
several trading activities. For instance, the user cannot specify a global budget constraint at the
root of the tree instead of specifying a limit price for each ETA. The following assumptions are also
made to define the scope of the negotiation aspects of the model.
• One–to–one negotiation: Each ETA is assigned exactly one trading partner. However, different
ETAs can trade with different trading parties.
• Single issue negotiation: The negotiation between the ETAs and the trading partner are based
on the price attribute only.
• Atomic allocation: When a deal is made, all items under the negotiation will be traded.
• Fixed deadline: All negotiations have fixed deadlines and every offer is issued with an expiry
time.
• Non–retractable offers: Bids and offers exchanged between trading parties are binding and
cannot be withdrawn until they expire. However, trading parties can exchange non–binding
messages (e.g. quotes) in addition to binding ones.
• Probability functions: We assume that probability functions capturing the likelihood of an offer
leading to a deal, are available. These probability functions can be obtained either from input
from an expert trader, or by analyzing the history of similar past negotiation episodes.
Based on these assumptions, the following types of ETAs are supported by the proposed model.
• Buyer ETA with English auction protocol.
• Buyer ETA with Dutch auction protocol.
• Buyer ETA with first–price sealed bid auction (tender) protocol.
• Buyer/seller ETA with alternating offers bargaining protocol.
• Buyer ETA with Vickrey auction protocol.
• Seller ETA with Reverse auction protocol.
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Note that an ETA cannot play the role of the auctioneer in an English auction, since this would
require interacting with multiple parties (i.e. multiple bidders). Similarly, an ETA cannot play the
buyer role in a reverse English auction. Also, we do not consider the continuous double auction
protocol, since it allows partial matching (non–atomic allocation) of bids/asks and also it allows
bids and asks to be withdrawn before expiration.
Common interface: The ETAs within the model may employ different protocols to negotiate
with different trading partners. Negotiation protocols frame the interactions between negotiating
parties: what deals can be made and what sequences of offers are allowed [15]. Each negotiation
protocol has its own distinct characteristics. The sequences of interactions between two participants
in a negotiation are different from one protocol to another. Therefore, a generic homogeneous
interface is required to invoke, monitor, and control these trading activities. In addition, within a
nested trading activity, an internal node can have other internal nodes or elementary activities as
child nodes. Due to the hierarchical and composable nature of the model, the same interface should
be applied throughout the tree so that an internal node can communicate indistinguishably with
other internal nodes and with elementary trading activities.
In the proposed generic interface (depicted as filled rectangles in figure 2), two types of messages
are defined: instructions and reports. Instructions are always propagated downwards and reports
are propagated upwards. Instructions are sent from a parent node to its child node. Reports are
sent from a child node to its parent. The type of instructions which can be sent are: (1) initialize
all child processes to generate negotiation plans, (2) start the execution of generated negotiation
processes, and (3) end all negotiation processes. There are two types of reports: status reports
(successful, ended, ready–to–negotiate, failed) and property reports (certainty, estimated payoff,
probability).
Overview of the synchronization process: An execution of a composite trading activity,
viewed as a tree, begins when the root of the tree receives the instruction ‘initialize’ from a user
(e.g. a trader). This instruction is then propagated downwards through the nodes of the tree until
it reaches the ETAs. When an ETA receives this instruction, it reports its properties (estimated
payoff for negotiating with a selected price, probability of making a deal with that price, and the
interval in which the reporting ETA is considered to be certain or contingent in making a deal) to
the parent node.
For each CTA, a set of possible negotiation plans are generated during the initialization phase
based on the information provided by its child nodes. Each plan identifies the set of child nodes
that will be scheduled to negotiate, and the time points at which negotiations are scheduled to be
performed. These plans are then ordered based on their expected utilities. The expected utility of
a plan is based on the utilities of all possible outcomes should the plan be executed. The plan with
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the highest utility is then chosen for execution. Based on the highest utility plan, a CTA derives it
own properties such as limit price, certainty, turnaround time, the estimated payoff, and probability.
These properties are then reported to its parent node. Plan generation and upward propagation of
properties is repeated at every CTA until a suitable negotiation plan is found at the root of the tree.
Once a complete plan is computed, the trader may decide to execute the plan by issuing the
‘negotiate’ instruction to the root of the tree. Starting from the root, each CTA propagates this
instruction to a selected subset of its child nodes according to the negotiation plan that was computed
for that CTA in the previous step. This propagation continues until the ‘negotiate’ instruction
reaches the ETAs. The ETAs in turn negotiate (i.e. exchange messages) with their respective trading
partners and report the results of the negotiation to their parents. Based on the results collected
from its child nodes, a CTA determines its own state (successful or failed) and reports this state to
its parent node. This propagation of states continues until they reach the root of the tree which in
turn reports its own status to the trader. The trader may decide to end the negotiation process or
repeat the whole process until a successful completion is achieved.
During a negotiation, the trader may decide to terminate the negotiation process by issuing the
‘end’ instruction to the root. If a CTA receives an ‘end’ instruction, it changes its state into ‘ended’
and forwards the instruction to all of its affected child nodes. However, a node cannot be instructed
to end if it is executing a plan. When a leaf node receives an ‘end’ instruction, it withdraws from
the current negotiating process (if possible) and changes its own state into ‘ended’.
At a given point in time, a CTA can be in one of the seven possible states: (1) i: idle and available
for synchronization, (2) w: waiting for the result of plan generation, (3) r: ready for negotiation
(by executing the plan), (4) p: plan is being executed, (5) s: successful in plan execution, (6) f : a
valid plan cannot be found or CTA has failed in the execution of a plan, and (7) e: negotiation has
ended. The possible transitions among these states are depicted in figure 3.
During the planning phase, the ETAs must provide sufficient data to their parent nodes so that
negotiation plans can be generated and further propagations to the upper levels can be performed.
An ETA derives the data based on the current status of the trading partner, offers received, the
histories of previous deals and the type of protocol being employed.
3 Negotiation protocols and elementary trading activities
As stated in the previous section, each ETA is in charge of negotiating with a given trading party
using a given negotiation protocol. Depending on the nature of the protocol used and the stage of
the negotiation, an ETA may be in the situation where it has received a (binding) proposal from
the trading party, or it may be in the situation where it has the possibility of sending a (binding)
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proposal to the trading party.1 Accordingly, we define a dynamic property called certainty which can
be used to categorize trading activities based on their likelihood of achieving a successful negotiation.
3.1 Certainty vs. contingency
A trading activity is said to be secure when it has received a (binding) proposal from the trading
partner. A trading activity is said to be contingent when it is planning to send a (binding) proposal
to the trading partner. A secure trading activity is guaranteed of achieving a deal if it sends an
acceptance message to the trading partner, while a contingent activity has no means of guaranteeing
that it can achieve a deal. An example of a secure ETA is one that has received a quote from a fixed-
price seller with unlimited supply. The ETA is guaranteed to make a deal if it sends an acceptance
message. On the other hand, an ETA in charge of bidding in an English auction is contingent for
the duration of the auction, since it is able to send a proposal (bid) to the auctioneer, but it cannot
guarantee that this bid will lead to a deal. The other ETAs supported by the proposed model can
be categorized as follows:
• Buyer ETA with Dutch auction protocol: contingent for the duration of the auction, since
ETA is able to send an “accept proposal” to the auctioneer. Note that sending an “accept
proposal” does not guarantee a deal since other ETAs may send “accept proposal” messages
at the same time.
• Buyer ETA with first–price sealed bid auction (tender) protocol: contingent for the duration
of the auction, since ETA is able to send a proposal (bid) to the auctioneer.
• Buyer/seller ETA with alternating offers bargaining protocol: contingent when ETA is plan-
ning to send a proposal, secure when it has received a proposal (detailed explanation is given
in section 2.3).
• Buyer ETA with Vickrey auction protocol: contingent for the duration of the auction, since
ETA is able to send a proposal (bid) to the auctioneer.
• Seller ETA with reverse auction protocol: secure when ETA has received proposals from the
buyers.
Note that at some points in time, an ETA may be neither contingent nor secure. Situations
where this can occur include:
• During the initialization stages of the negotiation when neither binding proposals nor quotes
have been exchanged
1Note that when the trading party is an auction, the act of sending a binding proposal is usually called “placing a
bid”.
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• When a proposal has been received but which expired before it was accepted and no other
proposal has been received afterwards
• When a designated window of opportunity for sending a proposal has passed
• When the negotiation has finished
Due to communication, processing, and other delays imposed by the trading party or the ne-
gotiation protocol, when a contingent ETA sends a proposal to a trading party, it may take some
time to receive a reply. In light of this, we define the turnaround time of a contingent ETA as the
maximum estimated duration for receiving a reply from a trading party when a proposal is sent. For
instance, the turnaround time of an ETA bidding in a Dutch auction is equal to the elapsed time
required to receive a reply from the auctioneer once an offer to buy the item at the current price
is sent (as depicted in figure 4). We assume that the estimated turnaround time for each ETA is
known at any time when the ETA is in a contingent state.
In order to illustrate the derivation of the secure/contingent property and its relation to the
internal workings of the ETAs, a buyer trading activity with English auction protocol and a buyer
trading activity with alternating offers bargaining protocol are selected as examples.
3.2 Example #1, a buyer trading activity with English auction protocol
Over the last few years, the number of online auction houses has increased dramatically. Traders
participating in those auctions face problems of (a) monitoring multiple auctions houses, (b) selecting
the right auction in which to bid, and (c) evaluating the next bids that are consistent with their
requirements. The processes of monitoring, selecting and evaluation are tedious and time consuming.
Besides, most of the auctions have different start and end times and can last for days and even weeks.
Most Internet auction sites provide bidders with a kind of automated bidding mechanism called
“Proxy Bidding” [4]. Proxy bidding is simply the auction house bidding on behalf of the bidder.
Users normally enter their reserve price and the minimum increment value. The proxy bidding tool
will then bid on behalf of the user while informing users of the outcomes of the bidding from time
to time. However, according to [20], bidders are not using the proxy bidding functions to bid early
in the auction. The strategic reasons for late bidding [25] include avoiding bidding wars (some of
them are caused by shill bidders) and protecting own information about the item.
In online English auctions such as eBay and Amazon, sniping is a well–known practice of bidding
at the last moment before the auction closes. There are several third party tools available for sniping
[2, 3, 1]. According to a survey conducted by [25], 91% of the bidders consider late bidding as their
bidding strategy.
We take a similar approach for the design of an ETA for bidding in English auctions. Our trading
activity will bid with the price equal to its private valuation of the item at the last moment of the
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auction closing time and the result of the auction will be known within the estimated turnaround
time. Our approach is consistent with the fixed deadline auction such as eBay. In the case of Amazon
auctions with an automatic 10 minutes extension (when a bid is cast in the last ten minutes), the
turnaround time of the ETA must take into account the 10 minutes extension to know the result
of the bid. The turnaround time of an ETA bidding in online English auctions is equal to the sum
of (a) the duration starting from the time when the ETA has sent the bid to the auction till the
auction is closed, and (b) the total elapsed time required to receive a reply from the auctioneer after
the auction has been closed. This situation is depicted in figure 5.
Based on this concept, we define an ETA buying by means of the English auction protocol.
During the negotiation, the ETA can be in one of the six possible states: (1) i: idle and available
for synchronization, (2) w: waiting for information (current quote and auction closing time) from
the auctioneer, (3) r: ready for negotiation (bidding), (4) p: a bid is submitted and being processed
by the auctioneer, (5) s: successful, (6) e: failed to win the auction and negotiation has ended.
The possible transitions among these states are depicted in figure 6. The events (1),(3), and (4) in
figure 6 are originated from the actions (a),(c), and (d) described in figure 3.
In order to avoid ambiguity in capturing the internal behavior of the trading activity and to
have clear visualization of the state transitions, a Coloured Petri Nets (CP–net) of the ETA is given
in [29]. We use Petri nets for capturing this internal behaviour because they are especially well-
suited to model concurrency and because they have a sound mathematical foundation. Among the
various variants of Petri nets, we have chosen CP–nets due to their support for data types and their
ability to capture temporal constraints. In addition, CP–nets have an established tool base which
can be used among other things, to test the resulting specifications through simulation.
In the next paragraphs, we will show how a trading task with a different negotiation protocol
can be modelled using the same interface as for the English auction.
3.3 Example #2, a buyer trading activity using an alternating offers bargaining
protocol
Bargaining theory is basically categorized as axiomatic and strategic [27]. Axiomatic bargaining
theory assumes that there is a centralized decision maker (arbitrator) [36]. In contrast, strategic
bargaining theory analyzes the situation where agents make offers and counter–offers to each other
directly [27]. Since trading activities (ETAs) are intended to be directly interacting with the trad-
ing partners, we have chosen the alternating offers bargaining model [14] (also called monotonic
concession protocol [24]) as our basis for the bargaining situation.
One of the important properties of the alternating offers bargaining protocol is the possibility
of a trading activity switching between two different states during the negotiation: an ETA may be
in a state in which a deal can be guaranteed due to the receipt of an offer, or in a state in which a
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counter–offer has to be made (since the offer from the trading partner is unacceptable) and therefore
the ETA is not certain of making a deal. These two situations are depicted in figure 7.
Suppose that the ETA has received an offer from the trading partner. If the offer is acceptable
(considering the limit price), the ETA is considered as secure until the offer from the trading partner
expires. This situation is depicted in figure 7(a). In this case, the turnaround time of the ETA is
equal to one time instance. If the offer from the trading partner is unacceptable and if the ETA has
decided to make a counter offer, the ETA is considered as contingent until the offer from the trading
partner expires. This situation is depicted in figure 7(b). In this case, the turnaround time is equal
to the expiry duration of the counter offer made by the ETA.
Based on this concept, we define an ETA buying by means of the alternating offers bargaining
protocol. At any time, the ETA can be in one of the seven possible states: (1) i: idle and available
for synchronization, (2) w: waiting for the information (proposal) from the trading partner, (3)
r: ready for negotiation (ready to accept an offer or ready to send a counter–offer), (4) p: accept
offer or a counter–offer has been sent to the trading partner and is currently being processed, (5)
s: one of the trading parties has accepted the offer and therefore negotiation is successful, (6) f :
the offer from the ETA has been rejected (the offer has failed in a implicit way) and as a result,
a counter proposal is received from the trading partner, and (7) e: either side of the negotiation
party has decided to end the negotiation and therefore no agreement has been reached. The possible
transitions among these states are depicted in figure 8. A Coloured Petri Nets (CP–net) of the ETA
is also given in [29].
From these examples, we have shown that a common interface can be devised to operate trading
tasks with different negotiation protocols. In this interface, two types of messages are defined: in-
structions (initialize, end, negotiate) and status reports (ended(e), ready–to–negotiate(r), failed(f)).
Instructions are propagated downward from the parent nodes to the ETAs and status reports are
propagated upward from the ETAs to the parent nodes. Instructions and status reports may be
exchanged several times until the negotiations are completed. Based on the common interface and
the design of ETAs, our next step is to define an execution environment which allows an internal
node (CTA) to concurrently operate (synchronize) its child nodes (ETAs) using negotiation plans
while maximizing its expected utility.
4 Planning for negotiation
In previous work [30, 31, 32], we proposed a model in which synchronization of trading activities
is based on the quotes and offers which are received at a given time point. The estimated payoff
of each combination of available trading opportunities is then computed from the quotes and offers
received and the limit price set by the user. Based on these estimated payoffs, the engine can opt to
send a set of offers and to accept a subset of the offers that it has received. It is an assumption of
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this model that all the offers can be sent at the same time, and that the outcome of these offers will
be known immediately after they are sent. As a result, the applicability of the model is limited. For
example, it cannot deal with English auctions that end at different points in time, nor with situations
where the outcome of an offer is not known immediately after the offer is sent, but instead, a waiting
period is required. To cope with these limitations, the model proposed in this paper introduces the
notion of negotiation plan. A negotiation plan describes exactly which trading activities should be
executed and when. Negotiation plans are generated and ranked based on the their expected utility
as detailed in this section.
4.1 Valid plans
The selection, by an internal node, of which of its child nodes should negotiate is guided by a
negotiation plan. This plan contains information about the child nodes and the time points at which
negotiations are scheduled to be performed. To improve the chance of success, the total number
of child nodes scheduled in a negotiation plan may exceed the maximum requirement. In order to
avoid the total number of successful child nodes exceeding the maximum requirement, an execution
engine is assigned to every internal node. This engine monitors and controls the execution of the
plan. The engine is able to decide which child nodes are to be executed at the next time point,
based on the status of the tasks executed so far. In addition, the engine will always maximize the
number of successful child nodes whenever possible. Accordingly, we define the concept of a possible
negotiation plan (or negotiation plan for short), as follows.
Definition 4.1. (Possible Negotiation Plan). A possible negotiation plan P of an internal node N is
a set of tuples consisting of trading activities and time points {(c1, start1, end1), .., (cn, startn, endn)},
where starti and endi are the start time and end time of a predefined activity (e.g. bid or accept
proposal) of child node ci. A child node ci can only be scheduled once in the plan. The activity
associated with the child node ci must be executed at most once during starti and endi, and it takes
at least one time instance to complete (i.e. starti 6= endi). In addition, the execution must start at
starti and the result of the execution will be known before endi.
Functions: The following functions are used in the rest of the paper:
• Function min(N) and max (N) return the minimum and maximum number of child nodes to
be successful for an internal node N .
• Functions to access the elements of the tuples of a trading plan.
pact((c, s, e)) = c
pstart((c, s, e)) = s
pend((c, s, e)) = e
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• Functions to retrieve the set of trading activities, the start time, and the end time of a plan
P .
activity(P ) = {pact(p) | p ∈ P}
start(P ) = min
p∈P
pstart(p)
end(P ) = max
p∈P
pend(p)
• In the proposed model, time is defined as discrete, positive and bounded. Predicate in(t, p)
holds iff time point t is at or after the start time and before the end time of tuple p.
in(t, p) ≡ pstart(p) ≤ t < pend(p)
• Let secure(c) return true if c is a secure trading activity. Function sec(P ) returns the set of
secure trading activities of a plan P .
sec(P ) = {pact(p) | p ∈ P ∧ secure(p)}
• Since one or more trading activities can be scheduled simultaneously, tuples within the plan
can be grouped with respect to the time points. Function tslice(P, t) computes the time slice of
a plan P at time t, that is, the set of tuples of P which are scheduled to start or are scheduled
to be under execution at time t. Any time slice of P is also a possible negotiation plan.
tslice(P, t) = {p ∈ P | in(t, p)}
• Let T be the set of all time points and X be a set of tuples of trading activities and time
points {(c1, start1, end1), .., (cn, startn, endn)}. We define the selected time points set stp(X)
to be the set of time points at which trading activities start or end. During the plan validation
process, instead of checking time points, this selected time points set is used to improve the
efficiency of the algorithm.
stp(X) = {t ∈ T | ∃x ∈ X (pstart(x) = t ∨ pend(x) = t)}
Using these functions and predicates, we seek to formalize the conditions that a possible negoti-
ation plan needs to fulfill in order to be valid. We first formulate these conditions informally.
(1) Time constraint: The time at which the trading activity is scheduled must not violate the
trading activity’s time constraints. Otherwise, there is no way that the trading activity can be
executed.
(2) Maximization constraint: Executing a secure trading activity within a plan is guaranteed
to lead to a deal. Therefore, the total number of secure trading activities within the plan must not
exceed the maximum number of successful trading activities.
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(3) Minimization constraint: Executing secure trading activities at the start of a plan requires
that there are sufficient secure trading activities in the rest of the plan to guarantee the achievement
of at least min(N) child nodes. Otherwise, secure trading activities should not be scheduled at the
beginning. Hence, if a secure trading activity is scheduled at the beginning of the plan, there should
be at least min(N) secure trading activities in the plan.
On the other hand, if there are no secure trading activities at the beginning of the plan (i.e.
the plan starts with contingent activities), then min(N) − 1 secure trading activities are required
in the plan. Indeed, based on the outcome of the execution of the contingent trading activities
at the beginning of the plan, the execution engine may decide to continue or to abort the overall
execution. If at least one of the contingent trading activities is successful, some or all of the secure
trading activities scheduled after the contingent trading activities will be executed. If none of the
contingent trading activities is successful, the execution is stopped to avoid achieving less than
min(N). Therefore, it is required to check whether there are any secure trading activities scheduled
at the start of the plan. An example of a set of tuples scheduled at the start of a plan P is depicted
in figure 9. T1 and T2 are considered as concurrent since T2 starts before T1 finishes. Similarly, T3
and T2 are considered as concurrent since T3 starts before T2 finishes. T4 and T2 are considered
as concurrent since T4 starts before T2 finishes. As a result, T1, T2, T3 and T4 are in the set of
tuples which are scheduled at the start of plan P . We call this the first chain of trading activities
(FCT). An end point is used to separate the trading activities which are within the FCT from the
rest of the plan (e.g. time point 6 in figure 9).
Definition 4.2. (End time of FCT). The end time of the first chain of trading activities of a plan
P is e (i.e. fctend(P ) = e) iff:
1. There exists at least one trading activity in the plan P which ends exactly at time e. (This
is to avoid a potential gap between the last trading activity in the FCT and the end point
chosen. For instance, in figure 9, trading activity T4 ends at time point 6. Therefore no gap
exists.)
∃p ∈ P (pend(p) = e)
2. No trading activity is still executing at time e. (A trading activity p is considered as executing
at time point t if and only if p starts before t and finishes after t. For instance, in figure 9, there
is no trading activity still executing at time point 6. T4 has started at time 4 and finished
before time 6. T5 will start at time point 6 and complete at time point 8. Therefore neither
of them are considered as executing at time point 6.)
¬∃p ∈ P in(e, p)
3. For every time point after the start time of the plan P and before the end point e, there should
be at least one active trading activity. (This is to avoid any potential gap in the middle of a
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chain. For instance, we cannot choose 9 as the end point of FCT in figure 9 since the chain
will be broken at time 6.)
∀t ∈ T, start(P ) < t < e⇒ ∃p ∈ P (in(t, p) ∧ pstart(p) 6= t)
Based on this definition, we define the function fct(P ) which returns the set of tuples within the
FCT of the plan P . In figure 9, fct(P ) = {(T1, 1, 3), (T2, 2, 5), (T3, 3, 4), (T4, 4, 6)} which contains
the trading activities scheduled within interval 1 to 6.
fct(P ) = {p ∈ P | pend(p) ≤ fctend(P )}
(4) Limit on every time slice: For a plan to be valid, there must be at least one situation
in which all trading activities in any particular time slice are required to be executed. Therefore,
when executing a time slice, there is a possibility that all trading activities within that slice are
successful. In addition, any secure trading activities scheduled before and up to the current time
slice are guaranteed to be achievable. Let,
secsofar(P, t) = |{p ∈ P | ∃e ∈ t : p ∈ tslice(P, e) ∧ secure(p)}|
The maximum number of trading activities likely to be successful up to the current time slice t is
equal to secsofar(P, t) + |tslice(P, t)|, which must not exceed max(N). Otherwise, execution of the
plan will result in the number of successful trading activities exceeding the maximum requirement.
However, there is a specific situation in which a contingent trading activity is taken into ac-
count as successful when remaining secure trading activities are executed. We define a predicate
startwithcon(P ) which holds iff the total number of secure trading activities in the plan P is equal
to min(N)− 1. The implication is that, if we do not have enough secure trading activities to fulfill
the minimum requirement, it is required that at least one contingent trading activity is scheduled
in the FCT of the plan so that min(N)− 1 secure trading activities can be executed.
startwithcon(P ) ≡ |sec(P )| = min(N)− 1
We define a predicate secexecuted(P, t) which holds iff one or more secure trading activities are
executed earlier or within the current time slice.
secexecuted(P, t) ≡ |sec(tslice(P, t))|+ secsofar(P, t) > 0
If contingent trading activities are scheduled at the start of the plan (i.e. startwithcon(P ) = true)
and if there is a possibility that any secure trading activities might have been executed earlier
or within the current time slice (i.e. secexecuted(P, t) = true), we must assume that at least one
contingent trading activity must be successful before the rest of the plan can be executed. Therefore,
for every time slice, the sum of: (a) the total number of secure trading activities up to the current
point, (b) the total number of trading activities in the current time slice, and (c) one contingent
trading activity which is assumed to be successful (when there are no secure trading activities in the
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FCT), must be less than or equal to max(N). A plan is examined for any violation of this constraint
at every time point within the selected time point set.
Based on these conditions, we define a valid negotiation plan as follows:
Definition 4.3. (Valid Negotiation Plan). A possible negotiation plan P of an internal node N ,
P ⊆ N.Children × T × T ,2 is said to be a valid plan, written validPlan(N,P ) iff:
1. The duration of the trading activity falls within the trading activity time constraints. Assuming
that tstart(c) and tend(c) are the start and end time of trading activity c.
∀ p ∈ P : tstart(pact(p)) ≤ pstart(p) ∧ pend(p) ≤ tend(pact(p))
2. In order to avoid the number of successful trading activities exceeding the maximum require-
ment, the total number of secure trading activities in the plan must be less than or equal to
max(N).
|sec(P )| ≤ max(N)
3. The total number of secure trading activities in the plan must be at least min(N)− 1 if there
are no secure trading activities in first time slice, and at least min(N) otherwise.
|sec(P )| ≥ min(N)− [|sec(fct(P ))| = 0]
In this expression, we use Kenneth Iverson’s convention [12], [p] = 1 if p is true and [p] = 0 if
p is false. Thus, [|sec(fct(P ))| = 0] is equal to 1 if there are no secure trading activities at the
start of the plan.
4. At any time, the total number of potentially successful trading activities within a valid plan
must not exceed the upper bound imposed by max(N).
∀t ∈ stp(P ) : secsofar(P, t) + |tslice(P, t)|+ [startwithcon(P ) ∧ secexecuted(P, t)] ≤ max(N)
We define a function plan(N) which returns the set of all possible valid plans of an internal node
N .
plan(N) = {p ⊆ N.Children × T × T | validPlan(p,N)}
Since several valid plans may exist for an internal node, a prioritization scheme is needed to
select the best plan available. The concept of expected utility for a bidding agent was studied in
[18, 28]. The expected utility of an agent is equal to the product of the probability of winning the
auction by submitting bid b and the payoff obtained from b. In the next section, we propose an
approach which can be used to compare plans with respect to their expected utilities.
2N.Children denotes the set of child nodes of N and T denotes the set of all time points.
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4.2 Expected utility
Several outcomes are possible when a valid plan is executed. The expected utility of a valid plan
is based on the probability of each potential outcome and its estimated payoff. We define a valid
outcome of a valid plan as follows:
Definition 4.4. (Valid outcome). A valid outcome v of a valid plan P of an internal node N is a
set of trading activities such that:
• All members of v must appear within the valid plan P .
v ⊆ {pact(p)|p ∈ P}
• The cardinality of v must be between the minimum and maximum number of child nodes
required to be successful.
min(N) ≤ |v| ≤ max(N)
• The trading activities from v must not be in ended states.
∀c ∈ v : status(c) 6= ‘e’
where status(N) returns the status of node N .
Let pset(X) be the power set of set X. We define function vout(P,N) which returns the set of
all valid outcomes of a valid plan P of an internal node N .
vout(P,N) = {c ∈ pset(activity(P )) |min(N) ≤ |c| ≤ max(N)}
However, there can be more than one way to achieve a valid outcome. For instance, if more
than one trading activity is scheduled at the same time, the execution engine may need to make a
choice to avoid exceeding the maximum requirement. Different choices made by the engine can lead
to different ways of achieving an outcome.
4.2.1 Execution trace
An execution trace is one of the possible ways to achieve an outcome by selective execution of the
trading activities which are scheduled in a valid plan. One of the important concepts of the execution
engine is the maximization of the total number of successful negotiations whenever possible. Based
on the total number of successful child nodes in previous time points, the engine will select a certain
number of trading activities in the current time point for execution.
The examples of execution traces are given in figure 10 where vi denotes a valid outcome of the
plan and Evi.j represents one of the execution traces leading to outcome vi. (If there is only one
execution trace leading to an outcome vi then we simply write Evi instead of Evi.1 .) In example 2 of
figure 10, outcome v4 = {A,D} has two execution traces (Ev4.1, Ev4.2). Once A has been executed
and reported to be successful at time instance 2, the engine has to choose either B or C for execution.
Therefore two execution traces exist for the outcome v4. The engine must not select both B and C
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since the constraint on the maximum number of successful child nodes will be violated when both
of them are successful.
The total number of child nodes to be executed at the current time point is maximized with
respect to the upper limit on the number of child child nodes allowed to be successful max(N)
and the total number of available trading activities in the current time slice tslice(P, t). We define
sofar(Ev, t) to be the sum of (a) the total number of trading activities which have been successful
(i.e. appeared in the outcome v) and, (b) the total number of trading activities which are scheduled
in the current time slice of Ev :
sofar(Ev, t) = |{p ∈ v | ∃p′ ∈ Ev(p = p′ ∧ pend(p′) < t)}|+ |tslice(Ev, t)|
Based on this function, we define predicate validEt(Ev, P,N) which returns true if Ev is a valid
execution trace of plan P .
Definition 4.5. (Valid execution trace). An execution trace Ev of a valid outcome v of a plan P
of an internal node N is said to be a valid execution trace, written validEt(Ev, P,N) iff:
1. Ev is a subset of P :
Ev ⊆ P
2. At every time point, the sum of (a) the total number of trading activities which have been
successful (i.e. appeared in the valid outcome v) and, (b) the total number of trading activities
in the current time slice of Ev must not exceed the maximum number of required successful
negotiations.
∀t ∈ T, start(P ) ≤ t ≤ end(P ) ⇒ (sofar(Ev, t) ≤ max (N))
3. At every time point, if the sum of the number of trading activities which have been successful
and the number of trading activities in the current time slice of Ev is less than the maximum
number of required successful negotiations, there should not be any trading activity which is
scheduled in P but did not appear in Ev.
∀t ∈ T, start(P ) ≤ t ≤ end(P ) (sofar(Ev, t) < max (N)⇒ ¬∃p ∈ P | Ev int(p, t))
We define function et(v, P,N) which returns the set of all valid execution traces of a valid
outcome v a valid plan P at internal node N .
et(v, P,N) = {Ev ⊆ P | validEt(Ev, P,N)}
Once we define the concept of an execution trace, the next step is to calculate the probability of
an execution trace based on the trading activities scheduled. Probabilities of execution traces are
then used to calculated the probability of a given valid outcome.
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Probability of an execution trace Based on the histories of previous negotiations, the likelihood
of making a deal (e.g. winning an auction) at time t with a negotiation price (nprice(N)) by a trading
activity N can be determined by a probability function. The negotiation price is the price that the
trading activity is planning to use for negotiation (e.g. bidding).
Suppose that ps(p, t) is the probability of making a successful deal by negotiating with price p
at time t and ps(p, t) is the probability of failing to secure a deal by negotiating with price p at
time t. The probability of an execution trace Ev of a given valid outcome v is the product of the









4.2.2 Probability of a valid outcome






4.2.3 Payoff of a valid outcome
The next step in the calculation of expected utility is to estimate the payoff of an outcome. An
outcome may comprise one or more trading activities. The estimated payoff of a leaf node (ETA)
depends on the limit price, the transaction cost, and the negotiation price.
The limit price of a leaf node is set by the trader prior to the negotiation. Its value is static
throughout the negotiation unless it is modified by the user. The limit price of a selling leaf node
indicates the minimum amount the user is expected to gain whereas the limit price of a buying
leaf node indicates the maximum amount that the user is willing to spend. The limit price of a
selling leaf node is positive and the limit price of a buying leaf node is negative. Transaction cost is
one of the important issues in any trading situation. For instance, in financial trading, transaction
costs imposed by the brokers and exchanges pose a significant overhead to both buyers and sellers.
Transaction cost can be a fixed amount or may depend on the price of the items to be traded. In
our model, we assume that every leaf node has information about the estimated transaction cost.
The negotiation price is the actual price that a leaf node is going to bid (or propose) to the trading
partner. The negotiation price of a selling leaf node is set to be positive and the negotiation price
of a buying leaf node is set to be negative.
The payoff of a leaf node in general is an indication of how attractive the negotiation price is with
respect to the limit price. The payoff returns a positive value when the negotiation price is higher
than the limit price for a selling action or the negotiation price is lower than the limit price for a
buying action. The payoff of a leaf node returns a negative value when the negotiation price is lower
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than the limit price for a selling action or the negotiation price is higher than the limit price for a
buying action. Positive payoff represents a desirable position whereas a negative payoff represents
an undesirable position to the trader. The payoff also needs to take into account the transaction
cost. We define the payoff of a leaf node as follows:
payoff (N) = ngoprice(N)− limit(N)− tcost(N)





Finally, based on the definition of the payoff and the probability of an outcome, we define the
expected utility of a plan.
Definition 4.6. The expected utility utility(P,N) of a valid negotiation plan P of a node N is the
sum of the expected utilities of the valid outcomes of the plan. Suppose that vout(P,N) returns the




payoff (v)× prob(v, P,N)
We define the function maxp(N) of an internal node N , which returns a valid plan that maxi-
mizes the expected utility of N as follows:
maxp(N) yields a randomly chosen p ∈ plan(N) such that utility(p,N) = max
i∈plan(N)
(utility(i,N))
In this section, we proposed the concept of a valid negotiation plan and we defined the expected
utility of a plan based on the payoff and the probability estimation. In the next section, we will de-
scribe the overall scheme of plan generation, propagation and derivation of properties (e.g. certainty,
estimated payoff, etc. ) at the internal nodes, and the environment which monitors and controls the
execution of the maximum expected utilities plans.
5 Generation and execution of negotiation plans
Before any negotiation plans can be generated, the user is required to construct the trading model
based on the information of available trading partners (e.g. auctions), the number of successful
trading activities required, and the time constraints. The limit price for each ETA (leaf node) is
also set by the user. All nodes within the model are also assigned with a unique identifier. Due
to the tree–structured configuration, every member of the model is required to be coordinated in a
systematic way so that execution of the plans do not violate the predefined constraints. The general
outline of the overall approach is described as follows:
1. Once the specification of the model has been completed, the user issues the ‘initialize’ instruc-
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tion to the root which is then propagated downward until it reaches the ETAs.
2. An ETA then reports to its parent the limit price, certainty property (accompanied by the
expiry), turnaround time, and the probability function for calculating expected utility.
3. Based on the information provided by the child nodes, a parent node generates valid negotiation
plans and select a plan with the maximum expected utility. The parent node then records the
plan for execution.
4. Based on the maximum expected utility plan, an internal node derives it own properties such
as limit price, certainty, turnaround time, the estimated payoff, and the probability. These
properties are then reported to its parent node.
5. Step 3 & 4 are repeated until the properties are derived at the root and the maximum expected
utility plans are recorded at every internal node.
6. If the user agrees on the limit price (at the root) which indicates the total amount that the user
is expected to spend/gain with respect to the maximum expected utility plan, a ‘negotiate’
instruction is issued to the root authorizing the execution of the plan.
7. Once an internal node (or the root) receives a ‘negotiate’ message from its parent, it retrieves
the recorded maximum expected utility plan and sends ‘negotiate’ messages to the child nodes
within the plan which have their start times equal to the current time.
8. Step 7 is repeated at all internal nodes until a ‘negotiate’ message arrives at the ETAs (leaf
nodes). Once an ETA receives a ‘negotiate’ message from its parent, it executes its predefined
task (submit a bid or accept an offer) and waits for the result from the trading partner. Upon
receiving the result from the trading partner, the ETA reports it status (result) to its parent.
9. Based on the result of the executed child nodes, an internal node may decide to stop or
continue the execution of the plan. An internal node also constantly determines its own status
(successful, failed, or ended) and reports to the parent.
10. Step 9 is repeated until the root node is reached and the root node informs the user whether
the overall execution has succeeded or failed. Based on the result, the user may decide to end
the negotiation or he/she may choose to renegotiate by using new constraints. In the latter
case, an ‘initialize’ message is issued to the root and the whole process (from step 1 to 9) will
be repeated.
We can divide the above sequence into two major phases: plan generation (steps 1 to 5) and
execution (steps 6 to 10).
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5.1 Plan generation
The plan generation phase starts from the lowest level internal nodes of the tree. As described in
step 3 of the outline, plans are first generated based on the information provided by the ETAs (leaf
nodes). After the generation, a maximum expected utility plan is selected and properties are derived
based on that plan. These properties are then propagated to the parent node and the parent node in
turn generates plans based on the properties. As a result, plan generation followed by the derivation
and propagation of properties is performed at every internal node until it reaches the root.
5.1.1 Algorithm
A plan generation algorithm which can be used by any internal node is described in appendix
D. Plans are generated based on templates. A template is a subset of trading activities which
serves as a place holder for generating plans using all possible combinations of start and end time.
Templates are generated based on the powerset of a given set of trading activities. For instance, three
templates ({A,B}, {A}, {B}) can be generated at an internal node N which has two child nodes A
(tstart(A) = 4, tend(A) = 6) and B (tstart(B) = 6, tend(B) = 8) and a [1..1] constraint. Suppose
that the turnaround time of both A and B is 1. Template {A,B} can be used to generate four
possible plans {(A, 4, 5), (B, 6, 7)}, {(A, 4, 5), (B, 7, 8)}, {(A, 5, 6), (B, 6, 7)}, and {(A, 5, 6), (B, 7, 8)}.
Template {A} can be used to generate two possible plans {(A, 4, 5)} and {(A, 5, 6)}. Template {B}
can be used to generate two possible plans {(B, 6, 7)} and {(B, 7, 8)}. Altogether, eight possible
plans can be generated based on these templates.
The worst–case complexity of the valid plan generation algorithm is (at least) exponential on the
number m of trading activities. Indeed, in the worst case the algorithm generates 2m - 1 templates
and a number of plans are generated for each template. It is difficult to find a tight upper bound
for the total number of possible plans that are generated (which determines the complexity of the
algorithm). However, it can be observed that the algorithm will never generate the same plan twice
because it starts by generating plans from the template with the longest length before proceeding to
templates of shorter length, and because two templates cannot lead to the same plan. It can also be
observed that a possible plan is essentially a set of pairs (trading activity, start time).3 Assuming
that D is the duration of the longest trading activity, there are at most m × D combinations of
a trading activity with a possible timestamp for that activity. Therefore, there are at most 2m×D
possible plans, and this provides a rough upper bound for the complexity of the proposed algorithm.
3Note that, for convenience, the end times the activities are also included in a plan, but the end time associated
with an activity is entirely determined by the start time and the turnaround time.
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5.1.2 Deriving properties at internal nodes
After the plans are generated at an internal node, a plan with the maximum expected utility is
selected and designated for execution. In addition, the internal node will derive its own properties
based on that plan.
Probability: The probability of an internal node N is equivalent to the sum of the probabilities
of the valid outcomes which can result from the execution of the maximum expected utility plan.
Suppose that vout(P,N) is the set of all valid outcomes which can result from the execution of plan
P at node N and maxp(N) is the maximum expected utility plan of N :




Payoff: The estimated payoff of an internal node N is equivalent to the utility of the maximum
expected utility plan of node N divided by the probability of that node.
PR 2. payoff (N) = utility(maxp(N))prob(N)
Limit: A lower bound valid outcome is a valid outcome which is only able to achieve the minimum
number of required successful negotiations (min(N)). For instance, let {A,B}, {C,D}, {A,B,C},
{A,C,D}, and {A,B,C,D} be the valid outcomes of a internal node N which is constrained by the
synchronization construct [2..3], the lower bound valid outcomes of N are {A,B} and {C,D} since
their cardinality is equal to 2 (min(N) = 2). We define lbout(P,N) which returns a set of all lower
bound valid outcomes of plan P at node N .
lbout(P,N) = {c ∈ vout(P,N) | |c| = min(N)}
The limit price of an internal node represents the minimum amount the node is expecting to gain
or the maximum amount the node is willing to spend to achieve the minimum number of required
successful negotiations. Therefore the limit price of an internal node is equivalent to the sum of the
limit prices of the nodes of an outcome which is the minimum among all available lower bound valid
outcomes. Suppose that maxp(N) is the the maximum expected utility plan of node N .






Certainty property: An internal node N is said to be secure at the start time of a maximum
utility plan of N if it has at least min(N) secure child nodes. Suppose that the function sec(P )
returns the set of secure trading activities of plan P :
CT 3. (int(N) ∧ |sec(maxp(N))| ≥ min(N))⇒ secure(N, start(maxp(N)), start(maxp(N)))
An internal node N is said to be contingent at the start time of a maximum utility plan of N if
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it has min(N)− 1 secure child nodes.
CT 4. (int(N)∧|sec(maxp(N))| = min(N)−1)⇒ contingent(N, start(maxp(N)), start(maxp(N)))
In both CT 3 & 4, the start and end time of the certainty property is identical (i.e. both are
start(maxp(N)) since the internal node N must start executing the maximum expected utility plan
exactly at time s. This situation will be discussed in section 5 based on a paper mill scenario.
Turnaround time: The turnaround time of an internal node N is equivalent to the duration of
a maximum expected utility plan of N . Let s = min
i∈maxp(N)
pstart(i) and e = max
j∈maxp(N)
pend(j):
TA 2. turn(N) = e− s
Once the properties have been derived at an internal node, they are propagated to its parent
node. This process is repeated at every internal node until it reaches the root. The plan generation
phase completes when a maximum expected utility plan is found at the root. Based on the expected
utility and the limit price, the user may decide whether to start the negotiation, or to regenerate
new plans if the current plan is not acceptable, or to end the whole process. If the user has decided
to start the negotiation, a ‘negotiate’ message will be issued to the root.
5.2 Plan execution
The execution phase begins when the user issues the ‘negotiate’ message to the root node. This
message is then propagated to lower–level nodes until it reaches the leaves, leading to offers and offer
acceptances being sent to the relevant trading partners. To understand this downward propagation
process and the subsequent rounds of upward/downward propagation of reports/instructions, it is
insightful to think as if each node was associated with an active thread of control, which we call
the node’s execution engine (or the node’s engine for short). Of course, this is just a metaphor: it
does not imply that the implementation of the propagation process is implemented by a collection
of threads (this could in fact lead to poor performance due to thread management overhead).
When an internal node in the ‘ready-to-negotiate’ state receives the ‘negotiate’ instruction from
its parent, the node’s engine sends ‘negotiate’ statements to all the child nodes in the first chain of
trading activities of the node’s plan, and moves to the ‘negotiate’ state. Subsequently, the engine
receives ‘successful’, ‘failed’, or ‘ended’ reports from its child nodes. Based on these reports, the
engine can decide to stop (either because it has successfully achieved its goal or because it can no
longer achieve it) or to continue. Let sucsofar(N), failedsofar(N), and endedsofar(N) be the number
of child nodes of node N in successful, failed, and ended state respectively, and let childcount(N)
be the total number of child nodes in the plan of node N. A node’s engine will stop and report a
‘successful’ status to its parent if:
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• The number of successful child nodes is equal to the maximum number of required successful
negotiations (i.e. sucsofar(N) = max(N)).
• There are no more child nodes remaining in the plan and the number of successful child
nodes is between the minimum and maximum number of required successful child nodes (i.e.
min(N) ≤ sucsofar(N) ≤ max (N)).
Similarly, the engine will stop and reports a ‘failed’ state to its parent if:
• The next child node in the plan is a secure node and there are insufficient secure child nodes in
the rest of the plan to guarantee that the minimum requirement (min(N)) will be met. (This
termination rule ensures that when the child nodes in the plan are exhausted, the number of
successful child nodes is either zero or greater than min(N).)
• The total number of child nodes which are in the ended or failed state is sufficiently high so that
it is impossible to achievemin(N) using the current plan (i.e. endedsofar(N)+failedsofar(N) >
childcount(N) − min(N)), yet the number of child nodes which are in the ended state is
sufficiently low that it is still possible to continue with a new plan (i.e. childcount(N) −
min(N) ≥ endedsofar(N)).
• There are no more child nodes remaining in the plan and the number of successful child nodes
is less than the minimum requirement (i.e. sucsofar(N) < min(N)).
Finally, the engine will stop and report an ‘ended’ state to its parent if the total number of child
nodes in the ended state is greater than the maximum number of child nodes allowed to be in the
ended state (i.e. endedsofar(N) > childcount(N)−min(N)).
If none of the above conditions is satisfied, the node’s engine can continue with the plan execution.
To do so, it sends a ‘negotiate’ instruction to the child nodes in the plan which are scheduled at the
current time point (i.e. the “current time slice”). However, to ensure that the maximum number of
successful child nodes (max(N)) is not exceeded, if the total number of child nodes in the current
time slice plus the total number of child nodes successful so far exceeds (max(N)), the engine will
select only a subset of child nodes from the current time slice, in such as a way that the maximum
requirement is not violated even if all the pending child nodes (i.e. all the child nodes to which the
‘negotiate’ statement has been sent and which have not yet reported back) succeed.
During the negotiation, the user may decide at any time to cancel the negotiation process by
issuing an ‘end’ instruction to the root node which propagates this message downward. If an internal
node receives an ‘end’ message from its parent node and if it is safe to stop (i.e. it is not in a processing
state), ‘end’ messages are sent to the child nodes. The node’s engine then sets the node’s state to
ended and reports this new state to the node’s parent. Otherwise, if it is not safe to stop (i.e. it is
too late to cancel), the ‘end’ message is simply ignored.
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If the engine has reported a ‘failed’ state to its parent, it may still be possible to continue with a
new plan which is computed with the nodes that are not ended. If the user has decided to renegotiate
with a new plan, an ‘initialize’ instruction is issued to the root node which propagates this message
downward. If an internal node receives an ‘initialize’ message from its parent and if it it is in a
‘failed’ state, it resets its state into ‘waiting’ and generates all potential valid plans. If a new valid
plan is found, the engine will report a ‘ready–to–negotiate’ state to its parent. If a valid plan cannot
be found, an ‘ended’ state will be reported. This plan generation process is possibly repeated at
every internal node which is in the ‘failed’ state until the root node is reached. If the user agrees
with the new valid plan, a ‘negotiate’ instruction is issued to the root node and this message is
propagated downward until it reaches the leaves, leading to a new round of negotiation with the
relevant trading partners.
The above informal description of the modus operandi of a node’s engine is formally presented
as a Coloured Petri net in [29].
Example: Suppose that an internal nodeN has five child nodes (A,B,C,D,E). The execution of a
valid plan P = {(A, 1, 3)(B, 2, 3), (C, 3, 4), (D, 3, 5), (E, 5, 6)} with a [2..2] synchronization construct
at node N is depicted in figure 11. There are 11 possible outcomes: {{A,C}, {B,C}, {A,D}, {B,D},
{A,E}, {B,E}, {C,E}, {D,E}, {C,D}, {A,B}, {}}. The empty set results when A, B, C, and D
have failed and the engine stops before executing E.
6 Example of plan generation and data propagation
Based on the paper mill scenario given in figure 1 & 2, an example on plan generation and data
propagation is depicted in figure 12. In this scenario, 500 tons of recycled fibre has to be purchased
from either of the sellers S1 or S2 and 300 galloons of hydrogen peroxide has to be purchased from
either of the sellers S3 or S4.
The elementary trading activity D in figure 12 is employed to negotiate with the seller S1 using
an alternating offer bargaining protocol . The purchasing department has set the limit price as $60
(per ton). At time 4, D has received an offer from S1 indicating that 500 tons of recycled fibre can
be bought at the price of $56 (per ton) and the expiry time of the offer is 11. Based on this offer,
we can derive that D is secure from time 5 to 11 (certainty interval) since it is holding a binding
offer from S1 and the offer is less than the limit price. D may accept the offer anytime during 5 to
11 if it is instructed to do so. There are 7 possible time points where D can be instructed to accept
the offer and we assume that it takes 1 time instant (turnaround time) to receive a confirmation if
D has sent an accept message to S1. Since D is holding a binding offer, the probability of making a
deal anytime during the certainty interval is equal to 1.
The elementary trading activity E is planning to bid in English auction S2. The auction closing
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time is 9. E is scheduled to bid just before the closing time of the auction and we assume that it takes
2 time instants (turnaround time) to receive the result of the bidding. Based on this information, we
can derive that E is contingent from time 8 to 10 since it is planning to send a binding offer to S2 at
time 8 and the result is expected to be announced at time 10. Suppose that a probability function
based on the histories of past auctions is available and the probability of winning the auction S2 by
bidding at the price of $55 (per ton) at time 8 is equal to 0.9.
Based on the certainty property (and interval), limit price, turnaround time, and the probability
functions of D and E, ten valid negotiation plans (p1 to p10) are generated for the composite trading
activity B. For instance, according to the plan p10 = {(E, 8, 10), (D, 11, 12)}, E will be instructed
to bid at time 8 and D will be instructed to send an acceptance at time 11. However, the execution
engine of B will make sure that D will only be asked to accept the deal if E has lost the auction.
There are two possible outcomes v1 = {E} or v2 = {D}. The execution trace of v1 is ev1 = {E}
and v2 is ev2 = {E,D}. Based on the outcomes, execution traces, and the probability functions, the
expected utility is calculated for each plan. For composite trading activity B, plan p9 and p10 have
the highest expected utility. Suppose that we have arbitrarily selected p9 as the maximum expected
utility plan. Based on p9, the property of B can be derived as follows:
• Since the total number of secure trading activities in p9 is equal to the minimum number
of child nodes required to be successful (min(B) = 1), B is considered secure. The certainty
interval of B is [8,8] since if p9 has to be executed, it must be started exactly at time 8.
• The turnaround time of B is 3 time instances since the execution of p9 starts at time 8 and
finishes at 11.
• The probability of B is the sum of the probability all outcomes of p9. The probability of B
is equal to 1 since the probability of the first outcome (v1) is 0.9 and the probability of the
second outcome (v2) is 0.1.
• The payoff of B is the utility of p9 divided by the probability of B (i.e. 2450).
• The limit price of B is the sum of the limit prices of the child nodes within an outcome
which is the minimum among all available lower bound valid outcomes. The lower bound valid
outcomes of p9 are v1 = {E} and v2 = {D}, and limit(v1) = limit(v2) = 30000. Therefore,
the limit price of B is 30000.
After the above properties have been derived at B, they are propagated to root A.
Elementary trading activity F in figure 12 is employed with an alternating offer bargaining
protocol to negotiate with seller S3. The purchasing department has set the limit price as $10 (per
gallon). At time 4, F has received an offer from S3 indicating that 300 gallons of hydrogen peroxide
can be bought at the price of $11 (per gallon) and the expiry time of the offer is 7. Since the offer
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is higher than the limit price, F is scheduled to make a counter offer at time 5 for $8 per gallon
with expiry of 2 time units (turnaround time). Based on this information, we can derive that F is
contingent from time 5 to 7 (certainty interval) since it is planning to send a binding counter offer
to S3. F may send the counter offer anytime during 5 to 7 if it is instructed to do so. There are 3
possible time points where F can be instructed to send the counter offer. We assume that, according
to a probability function, the probability of making a deal by sending the counter offer ($8) at time
5, 6 and 7 are 0.8, 0.7, and 0.6 respectively.
The elementary trading activity G is planning to bid in Dutch auction S4 and at time 4, it
has received an offer ($9 per gallon) from S4 which is going to expire at time 8. Since the offer is
less than the limit price, G may send the acceptance to the auctioneer anytime during time 5 to
8. However, since G can never guarantee winning the auction (it can happen when acceptance of
another bidder arrives at S4 just before the acceptance from G arrives), G is considered as contingent
and the certainty interval of G is 5 to 8. Suppose that, according to a probability function based on
past auctions, it is estimated that the probability of winning the auction by accepting the offer ($9)
at time 5, 6, and 7 are 0.9, 0.8, and 0.7 respectively.
From the information of F and G, eight valid negotiation plans are generated for the composite
trading activity C and plan p7 is chosen as the maximum expected utility plan for C. Based on p7,
certainty property, turnaround time, probability, payoff and limit price are derived for C and they
are subsequently propagated to its parent node A.
Finally, at composite trading activity A, one valid plan p1 = {(C, 5, 8), (B, 8, 11)} is generated
based on the properties of B and C. The execution engine of A will only instruct B to execute if
C has been successful so that A will achieve exactly 2 successful deals or none. A is considered as
contingent since the total number of secure child nodes in p1 is less than the minimum number of
child nodes required to be successful (i.e.min(A) = 2). The turnaround time of A is 6 since execution
of p1 must start at time 5 and complete at time 11. The probability of A is the probability of the
outcome v = {C,B} in which prob(C) = 0.94 and prob(B) = 1. The payoff of A is the utility of p1
divided by the probability of A (2972÷ 0.94 = 3161.7). The limit price of A is the sum of the limit
prices of the child nodes in the outcome v = {C,B} where limit(B) = 30000 and limit(C) = 3000.
By using selected properties of the trading activities and the given probabilities functions, the
above example has shown that negotiation plans can be generated for all composite trading activities
in the model. Every plan generation at an internal node is followed by the derivation and propagation
of properties and the whole process continues upward until it reaches the root.
Once a maximum expected utility plan is found at the root, the user of the model may decide to
execute the plan. In this case, a ‘negotiate’ instruction is issued to the root. When an internal node
receives a ‘negotiate’ instruction, it retrieves its own maximum expected utility plan and executes
it by using the execution engine described in the previous section.
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7 Conclusion
This paper describes a novel multi–process model for synchronizing interrelated trading activities
involving possibly differing forms of negotiation. The model supports the specification of high–level
trading strategies by means of constraints, such as the number of required successful negotiations
using synchronization constructs, the limit price for the items to be traded, and temporal constraints
imposed by all trading parties. A special interface is defined to homogenize the trading activities
involved. Rules for propagation of price and time related properties have been formalized. A planning
and execution model for composite trading activities is proposed which is designed to maximize the
expected utility of the user.
The proposed model has been fully formalized using coloured Petri nets, logic rules, and algo-
rithms. This formalization has been used to perform an implementation of the model’s building
blocks, and to test the correctness of the model against a number of examples of various sizes. Be-
cause the proposed technique for plan selection performs a naive exhaustive search of the entire space
of possible plans, the current implementation is not able to deal with plans containing nodes with
more than 8 children within reasonable time frames (i.e. < 45 seconds). A direction for future work
is to apply non-exhaustive search techniques such as hill climbing, tabu search or genetic algorithms,
in order to achieve a more scalable implementation.
Our framework has been used to specify composite trading activities from the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) [35] as a feasibility analysis. The TAC is an international forum designed to
promote and encourage high quality research into the trading agent problem. Two types of games
are played in the competition, TAC Classic and TAC SCM (for Supply Chain Management). The
result from the feasibility analysis based on our framework on TAC SCM has been reported in [33].
We are also planning to develop the trading agents based on the model to compete in the future
TAC SCM competitions.
Further analysis can also be performed to determine whether longer plans (plans with higher
number of trading activities) are more likely to maximise the overall utility compared to the shorter
ones. If longer plans are preferable, they can be given higher priority during plan generation.
Another possibility is to check whether there are sufficient numbers of secure trading activities prior
to the plan generation. If there are insufficient numbers of secure trading activities, valid plans may
not be found by the algorithm, and therefore, plan generation can be avoided.
The proposed framework can easily be generalised to cater for multi-attributes negotiations. For
instance, calculation of the payoff at the leaf nodes (payoff (N)) can be extended with multi-attribute
utility functions. When child nodes are selected for negotiation, they can be prioritised based on
the overall utility. A higher utility represents a desirable position whereas a lower utility represents
an undesirable position to the trader.
One of the potential extensions to the framework is to introduce a global budget. Note that the
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limit price indicates the total amount that the user is expected to spend/gain with respect to the
maximum expected utility plan. A limit price is a hard requirement which has to be strictly enforced
whereas a global budget can be served as a soft lower/upper bound. If replanning is required, a
predefined global budget at an internal node can be used to re-adjust the limit price to generate
revised negotiation plans. Relaxing the limit price may result negotiation plans which have lower
expected utilities. One of the future work is to derive techniques to distribute a global budget among
the CTAs and ETAs.
Further investigation is also needed if the proposed framework is going to be used in areas such
as share trading and foreign exchange markets. Trading in a stock market is already a challenging
task for any trader. Concurrently trading in multiple stock markets is even more challenging since
these markets may operate in in different time zones, with varying rules, and using heterogeneous
electronic trading interfaces. Frequent and unexpected movement of prices is common in today’s
volatile market environment. Partial matching of orders in these market also significantly increase
the complexity of trading since the trader may need to decide whether to continue or to withdraw the
remaining portion of an order. At present, our approach is only limited to complete order matching
(atomic allocation). One of the future work is to extend the framework for partial order matching
by dynamically restructuring the CTAs and ETAs within the model.
The current framework only considers one-to-one negotiation between an elementary trading
activity and a respective trading partner. These can be extended to one-to-many negotiation where
an elementary trading activity may negotiate with one or more trading partners. This extension will
require substantial modification of designs for all types of elementary trading activities. However,
generalisation to one-to-many negotiation may be modelled as an equivalent composite trading
activity with alternative relationship. Therefore, the benefits achieved from the extension to one-
to-many negotiation can be offset by the increase in complexity.
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A Descriptions of predicates and functions
min(N) Minimum number of child nodes of node N that are required to be successful.
max (N) Maximum number of child nodes of node N that are required to be successful.
pact((c, s, e)) First element of triplet (c, s, e) corresponding to the child node.
pstart((c, s, e)) Second element of triplet (c, s, e) corresponding to the start time.
pend((c, s, e)) Third element of triplet (c, s, e) corresponding to the end time.
activity(P ) Set of trading activities of a plan P .
start(P ) Start time of a plan P .
end(P ) End time of a plan P .
in(t, p) Holds iff time point t is at or after the start time and before the end time of tuple p.
sec(P ) The set of secure trading activities of a plan P .
tslice(P, t) The set of tuples of P which are scheduled to start or are scheduled to be under
execution at time t.
stp(X) The set of time points at which trading activities start or end.
fctend(P ) The end time of the first chain of trading activities (FCT) of a plan P .
fct(P ) The set of tuples within the first chain of trading activities (FCT) of a plan P .
secsofar(P, t) The total number secure trading activities scheduled before and up to the current
time slice in the plan P .
startwithcon(P ) Holds iff the total number of secure trading activities in the plan P is equal to
min(N)− 1.
secexecuted(P, t) Holds iff one or more secure trading activities are executed earlier or within the
current time slice.
validPlan(N,P ) Holds iff P is a valid plan of an internal node N .
plan(N) The set of all possible valid plans of an internal node N .
pset(X) The power set of set X.
vout(P,N) The set of all valid outcomes of a valid plan P of an internal node N .
sofar(Ev, t) The sum of (a) the total number of trading activities which have been successful (i.e.
appeared in the outcome v) and, (b) the total number of trading activities which are
scheduled in the current time slice of Ev.
validEt(Ev, P,N) Holds iff Ev is a valid execution trace of the plan P of a node N .
et(v, P,N) The set of all valid execution traces of a valid outcome v a valid plan P at internal
node N .
ps(p, t) The probability of making a successful deal by negotiating with price p at time t.
ps(p, t) The probability of failing to secure a deal by negotiating with price p at time t.
42
prob(Ev) The probability of an execution trace Ev of a given valid outcome v.
prob(v, P,N) The probability of a valid outcome v of a valid negotiation plan P of a node N .
payoff (N) The payoff of a leaf node N .
payoff (v) The payoff of a valid outcome v.
utility(P,N) The expected utility of a valid negotiation plan P of a node N .
maxp(N) A valid plan that maximizes the expected utility of a node N .
prob(N) The probability of an internal node N .
payoff (N) The estimated payoff of an internal node N .
lbout(P,N) A set of all lower bound valid outcomes of plan P at node N .
limit(N) The limit price of an internal node N .
turn(N) The turnaround time of an internal node N .
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B Algorithms for valid plan generation
procedure generateValidPlan /* Main program. All plans are generated starting from the
longest and proceeding to the shortest. */
Input: numActivity: integer /* (positive) number of trading activities */
Local variables: template: Set of Integer
powerset: Set of template
tuple: Integer × Integer × Integer
plan: Set of tuple
possibleplan : Set of plan
found: Boolean
longest: template
Procedures: pset(i) = returns the powerset for i trading activities
maxlength(powerset) = return the longest template in the powerset





while (powerset 6= ∅ and found = false) do
longest := maxlength(powerset); /* begin with the longest template */
possibleplan := generateP lan(longest);
for p ∈ possibleplan do
if isvalid(p) then
validplan := validplan+ {p};
end
if validplan 6= ∅ then found := true;





procedure generatePlan(template)/* Recursive program to generate plans based on a tem-
plate - (called from procedure generateValidPlan) */
Input: template(i) = ith element of template
cstart(i) = start time of certainty interval of activity i
cend(i) = end time of certainty interval activity i
turn(i) = turnaround of activity i
Local variables: length, time: integer
p : plan
partial,temp,result: Set of plan
Output: result: Set of plan
begin
length := template.length();




partial := generateP lan(template− currentnode);
result := {{}};
/* generate all time points for currentnode */
for i := 1 to partial.size() do
temp := {{}};
p := {};
for time := cstart(currentnode) to cend(currentnode) do
p := partial(i) + {(currentnode, time, (time+ turn(currentnode)))};
temp := temp+ {p};
end






Buy 500 tons of
recycled fibre
from S1 or from S2
Buy 300 gallons of
hydrogen peroxide













Buy 500 tons of recycled fibre










Buy 300 gallons of hydrogen
peroxide from S3
Buy 300 gallons of hydrogen
peroxide from S4
Buy 500 tons of recycled fibre
from S1or from S2
and
Buy 300 gallons of hydrogen peroxide
from S3 or from S4

















Buy 500 tons of recycled fibre








Buy 300 gallons of hydrogen
peroxide from S3
Buy 300 gallons of hydrogen
peroxide from S4








(1) received `initialize` from the parent
(2) received `negotiate` from the parent
(3) received `end` from the parent
(4) found a valid plan
(5) cannot find a valid plan
Actions:
(a) send `initialize` to the child nodes
(b) send `ready-to-negotiate` to the parent node
(c) send `negotiate` to the child nodes
(d) send `end` to the child nodes
(e) send `successful` to the parent node











e/a: When event `e` is received, the transition is taken and the action `a` is executed.
[c]a: When condition `c` is satisfied, the transition is taken and the action `a` is executed.
Conditions:
(6) min <= succ <= max
(7) unable to continue with given conditions and available child nodes
































successful (s)processing (p)idle (i) waiting (w)
1/a
Events:
(1) received `initialize` from the parent node
(2) received quote and end time from the auctioneer
(3) received `negotiate` from the parent node
(4) received `end` from the parent node
(5) received `win` from the auctioneer
(6) received `lose` from the auctioneer
(7) timeout
Actions:
(a) get information (quote, end time) from the auctioneer
(b) send `ready-to-negotiate` to the parent node
(c) send bid to the auctioneer
(d) send `successful` to the parent node
























































(1) received `initialize` from the parent
(2) received offer from the trading partner
(3) received `negotiate` from the parent
(4) received `end` from the parent
(5) received `accept` from the trading partner
(6) received counter-offer from the trading partner
(7) received `end` from the trading partner
(8) timeout
Actions:
(a) send `cfp` to the trading partner
(b) send `ready-to-negotiate` to the parent node
(c) send `accept` to the trading partner
(d) send counter-offer to the trading partner
(e) send `successful` to the parent node
(f) send `failed` to the partner node
(g) send `ended` to the parent node





















Figure 8: State–transition diagram of an ETA buying by means of the alternating offers bargaining
protocol
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fct(P)={(T1, 1, 3), (T2, 2, 5), (T3, 3, 4), (T4, 4, 6)}
P={(T1, 1, 3), (T2, 2, 5), (T3, 3, 4), (T4, 4, 6), (T5, 6, 8), (T6, 7, 9)}
Figure 9: The first chain of trading activities in a plan
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v1 = {A,B},  Ev1 = {(A,1,3),(B,1,3)}
v2 = {A,C},  Ev2 = {(A,1,3),(B,1,3),(C,3,5)}






v1 = {A,B}  Ev1 = {(A,1,2),(B,2,3),(C,2,4)}
v2 = {A,C}  Ev2 = {(A,1,2),(B,2,3),(C,2,4)}
v3 = {B,C}  Ev3 = {(A,1,2),(B,2,3),(C,2,4)}
v4 = {A,D}  Ev4.1 = {(A,1,2),(B,2,3),(D,4,5)}
Ev4.2 = {(A,1,2),(C,3,5),(D,4,5)}
v5 = {B,D}  Ev5 = {(A,1,3),(B,2,3),(C,2,4),(D,4,5)}
v6 = {C,D}  Ev6 = {(A,1,3),(B,2,3),(C,2,4),(D,4,5)}
Example 1 Example 2
Figure 10: Execution traces
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Both A and B have failed
Both A and B are successful
C is successful
D is successful
Both C and D are successful
C has failed
D has failed









outcome = {C, D} or { }
Stop





outcome = {A, D} or {B, D}
Stop
outcome = {A, C} or {B, C}
Figure 11: The execution of a valid plan
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(B)
p1 = {(D,5,6)}, v  = {D}, e  = {D},
utility(p1) = 1x500x4 = 2000
p2 = {(D,6,7)}, v  = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p2) =1x500x4 = 2000
p3 = {(D,7,8)}, v  = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p3) = 1x500x4 = 2000
p4 = {(D,8,9)}, v  = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p4) =1x500x4 = 2000
p5 = {(D,9,10)}, v = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p5) =1x500x4 = 2000
p6 = {(D,10,11)}, v = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p6) = 1x500x4 = 2000
p7 = {(D,11,12)}, v = {D}, e = {D},
utility(p7) =1x500x4 = 2000
p8 = {(E,8,10)}, v = {E}, e = {E},
utility(p8) =0.9x500x5 = 2250
p9 = {(E,8,10),(D,10,11)},
v1 = {E}, e v1 = {E} ,
v2 = {D}, e v2 = {E,D},
utility(p9) =
(0.9x500x5)+ (0.1x500x4) = 2450
p10 = {(E,8,10),(D,11,12)},
v1 = {E}, e v1 = {E} ,
v2 = {D}, e v2 = {E,D},
utility(p10) =
(0.9x500x5)+ (0.1x500x4) = 2450
Derived properties based on
the maximum expected utility plan p9
secure(B,8,8)
turn(B) = 11 - 8 = 3
prob(B) = 0.9 + (0.1x1) = 1
profit(B) = 2450
limit(B) = 30000
Current time = 4
(C)
p1 = {(F,5,7)}, v = {F}, e = {F},
utility(p1) = 0.8x300x2 = 480
p2 = {(F,6,8)}, v = {F}, e = {F},
utility(p2) =0.7x300x2 = 420
p3 = {(F,7,9)}, v = {F}, e = {F},
utility(p3) = 0.6x300x2 = 360
p4 = {(G,5,6)}, v = {G}, e = {G},
utility(p4) =0.9x300x1 = 270
p5 = {(G,6,7)}, v = {G}, e = {G},
utility(p4) =0.8x300x1 = 240
p6 = {(G,7,8)}, v = {G}, e = {G},
utility(p4) =0.7x300x1 = 210
p7 = {(F,5,7),(G,7,8)},
v1 = {F}, e v1 = {F} ,
v2 = {G}, e v2 = {F,G},
utility(p7) =
(0.8x300x2)+ (0.14x300x1) = 522
p8 = {(G,6,7),(F,7,9)},
v1 = {G}, e v1 = {G} ,
v2 = {F}, e v2 = {F},
utility(p8) =
(0.8x300x1)+ (0.12x300x2) = 312
Derived properties based on
the maximum expected utility plan p7
contingent(C,5,5)
turn(C) = 8 - 5 = 3





v = {C,B}, e
v1 = {C,B} ,
utility(p1) = (0.94x555.31)+ (1x2450) = 2972
Derived properties based on the maximum
expected utility plan p1
contingent(A,5,5)





Buy 300 gallons of
hydrogen peroxide from S3
Employing Alternating Offer
Bargaining Protocol
F received an offer from S3 for
$11 per galon at time 4. The
offer expires at time 7. The limit
price set by the trader is $10 per
galon. F is planning to send a
counter offer to S3 ($8 with an
expiry of 2 time unit ).
contingent(F,5,7)
turn(F) = 2





Buy 300 gallons of
hydrogen peroxide from S4
Planning to bid in the Dutch
auction S4
G received an offer from S4 for
$9 per galon at time 4. The
offer expires at time 7. The limit
price set by the trader is $10 per
galon.  Turnaround time is 1.
contingent(G,5,8)
turn(F) = 1





Buy 500 tons of
recycled fibre from S1
Employing Alternating Offer
Bargaining Protocol
D received an offer from S1 for
$56 per ton at time 4. The offer
expires at time 11. The limit price
set by the trader is $60 per ton.
Turnaround time is 1.
secure(D,5,11)
turn(D) = 1









Buy 500 tons of recycled
fibre from S2
Planning to bid in the English
Auction S2
S2 closing time is 9. The limit
price set by the trader is $60 per
ton. The probability of E winning
the auction by bidding with $55
per ton at time 8 is 0.8.
Turnaround time is 2.
contingent(E,8,10)
turn(D) = 2








(D) (E) (F) (G)
Figure 12: Plan generation and data propagation
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